Excerpt from The Philosophical Review, Vol. 6
Recent logicians have protested against the old tradition of beginning with an account of terms or concepts, and have insisted that the judgment is the primary act of thought. But, in the reasons given for taking judgment first, I do not think a sufficient distinction is generally made between the logical and the psychological aspects of the question. That "the sentence precedes the word" in the historical evolution of language, seems proved from an examination of the beginnings of language among primitive races and among children. This is a fact of undoubted psychological interest, but I do not think it has any direct bearing on the logical question of whether the judgment or the concept is prior; for, let it be said once for all, priority in time is irrelevant in logic. The only priority that concerns us is logical priority. That is logically prior which is logically presupposed in something else; in other words, the logically prior is that on whose truth or on whose existence something else is dependent, but not vice versa. Which of them comes first into any individual"s mind, or into the average human mind, is a matter which is of itself of no logical moment.
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